# Speaker 2 – Organisational Adaptation

# and Interagency Synergy

Building on Sinéad’s analysis of how Ireland grapples with non-traditional threats from critical-infrastructure vulnerabilities to pandemic response, my task is to examine how military organisations must change structurally and culturally to assume resilience roles while preserving autonomy, ethics and legitimacy. The argument is simple: []

In line with our research question, we shall [] – using Ireland as the primary case-study.

**1| Civil–Military Trust and the Ethics of Resilience Roles**

We will now use Ireland as a case study of where trust in the military instrument is structurally weak. This is important since real resilience depends on the military and civil servants trusting one another, while still respecting democratic oversight.

**Cottey (2002), Brooks (2024)** and **Feaver (2003)** show that early democracies often tried to prevent coups by restricting military power or through so-called grand bargaining. This pattern is still visible in post-independence Ireland. It removes the military from politics. After the 1924 Mutiny, political suspicion created what **Huntington (1957**) called subjective control. It produced politicised micromanagement and weakened autonomy. Such a model suits authoritarian systems, not democracies.

In contrast, China’s military underpins the Communist Party. It sacrifices professionalism for control. Ireland’s model is different but shows the same need for trust-based resilience. Civilian oversight in Ireland is rooted in fear rather than confidence. It discourages democratic professionalism. In defence procurement, I have seen how inexpert interference delays progress and reduces effectiveness. This contrasts with **Janowitz’s (1960)** constabulary model, which promotes integration through shared values.

The Department of Defence’s dominance illustrates **Cottey**’s idea of civilian supremacy without democratic depth. It secures compliance but constrains accountability. Ireland’s first-generation mindset undervalues cooperation. It confines Defence to administrative rather than strategic roles. A shift towards democratic governance built on shared norms, mutual trust and transparent coordination would turn control from a constraint into an enabler of resilience. Without tested trust, integration will remain superficial.

We will now show why weakness in the military instrument matters when the Defence Forces operates within the state.

Expanding military roles within society carries real risks. **Burk (2002)** reminds us that legitimacy in democracies rests on consent, not control. **Cook (2004)** defines this as a professional duty to balance obedience with conscience, while **Moskos (2000)** warns that the post-modern military, part constabulary and part civil responder, risks losing its core identity. **Forster (2006)** and **Freedman (2006)** caution that over-securitisation of domestic life erodes trust faster than external threats.

As Sinéad noted, societal value depends on ethical execution, seen during pandemic restrictions and Defence support to civil authorities. For the Defence Forces, resilience roles in health, logistics or cyber must build trust rather than dependency. Every domestic task trades something: readiness, neutrality or perception. Without deliberate ethical design, expansion blurs civilian primacy. Ethics must move from annex to architecture through transparency, consent and proportion.

**Cottey (2002)** notes that democratic governance must include all security actors, including paramilitary police forces. In Ireland, however, the Garda Síochána remains outside that conversation, even as it develops such units. This creates a paradox: the state restrains its military through dense supervision yet grants its police growing coercive powers with limited policy scrutiny. The result is an incomplete model of []

**2| Concordance: Is Ireland’s Subjective Control Still Relevant**

**Schiff (1995)** argues that stability in civil–military relations comes from *concordance*. This means active agreement between the military, political leaders and society. When the three agree on four things – the officer corps, decision-making, recruitment and military style – coups are unlikely. **Huntington (1957)** preferred separation. He saw distance between politics and the military as the safest form of control. Schiff says that model is too rigid and based on the American experience.

**Ireland performs well on three of the four indicators.** It struggles only with political decision-making.

**Officer corps.** The Defence Forces are becoming more representative. In the past, officers came mainly from universities and narrow social groups. Today, the Potential Officer Programme promotes non-commissioned officers and welcomes greater ethnic and religious diversity. This reduces distance from society and builds shared understanding.

**Recruitment.** Ireland relies on voluntary service. All backgrounds are welcome. There is no conscription. This approach builds legitimacy and civic connection. People join because they want to serve. It mirrors Schiff’s examples of inclusive recruitment in Israel and India.

**Military style.** Irish military culture is restrained and professional. It values service and discipline, not bravado. This reflects national values of humility, peacekeeping and community engagement. It strengthens public trust at home and credibility abroad.

**Political decision-making.** Here Ireland performs poorly. The Defence Forces have little influence on policy, budgets or planning. Most decisions are made in the Department of Defence. This follows Huntington’s separation model, not Schiff’s cooperative one. The result is low trust and limited agility.

**Improvement requires dialogue.** Joint committees or formal advisory roles for senior officers could align Defence and government priorities. This would preserve civilian primacy while improving trust and responsiveness. This reflects **Brooks’ (2024)** call for adaptive civil–military partnerships in resilient democracies.

**Ireland shows strong concordance with society but weak concordance with its political leaders.** Better alignment would reduce the need for supervision. It would also make Defence a more flexible and trusted partner in national resilience.

**5 | Closing Transition to Romin**

Across these moves, the logic is consistent. [].

I close where Sinéad opened: resilience is not a slogan. It is a design discipline. It succeeds only when the military changes itself first and aligns with others second. Romin will now test this against the Ireland and United States cases Sinéad introduced, exploring cyber and disinformation threats—the true frontier of societal resilience.

“Taken together, these reforms show that the military instrument enhances societal resilience only when integrated deliberately with the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of power, not when it substitutes for them.”

**2 | From Mission Command to Strategic Concordance**

If mission command protects initiative inside the force, its principles can scale to the state. Resilience governance demands the same balance between central intent and local discretion. Applying mission command across instruments of power replaces command chains with trust networks – a cultural leap grounded in doctrine.

Schiff (1995) argues that the separation model is not the only model and that the most appropriate form of civil military relationship is a function of strategic culture.

the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society. Concordance theory says that the form of government is immaterial to coup-proof the state. What matters is that there is agreement between the politicians, military and public on the composition of the officer corps, the political decision making process, recruitment method and military style. If there’s agreement there, no coup.

**Feaver (2003)** calls this the agency dilemma: mistrust breeds monitoring; monitoring slows response. Whether on a battlefield or in a cyber incident, the same pathology appears – mistrust generates micromanagement. Mission command’s cure , clarity of intent and tolerance for initiative, is exactly what interagency resilience requires.

his concordance theory sees a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationship. Because all such rela tionships reflect specific institutional and cultural conditions shared by the three partners, no single type is seen as leading necessarily to domes tic military intervention. Concordance does not preclude the separation of civilian institutions and control of the military, but, under certain cultural conditions, civilian institutions or the very idea of "civil" may be inappro priate.

**Schiff (1995)** calls this *concordance*: alignment among political leadership, the military and society across four indicators : composition, decision-making, recruitment and style. Concordance turns friction into synergy. In modern terms, this is *strategic mission command*: national resilience through alignment, not hierarchy.

**Sinéad’s case study** of Ireland’s mixed record, which is effective in maritime resilience but strained during pandemics, reveals where concordance falters. The legacy of control from the 1924 Army Mutiny, as she implied through political caution, produced a culture of compliance rather than collaboration. **Huntington (1957)** valued subordination of the military; **Janowitz (1960)** urged integration through the constabulary. Ireland chose the former. **Brooks (2008)** notes that autocracies fragment power to prevent coups.

Post-independence Ireland mirrored that instinct, dispersing command and strengthening departmental oversight. The result was stability at the cost of agility. This is a cautious culture which endures. It is assessed as an obstacle to integrating the military instrument for national resilience.

The **Office of Emergency Planning** illustrates the problem. When the COS required an additional colonel as an aide, this appointment was removed from the OEP. There was a reluctance on the part of the Air Corps and Army to fill the other vacancies. This signals low institutional value.

**Limit.** Evidence on interagency performance is fragmented; no national metrics measure concordance.  
**Implication.** Establish a Joint Resilience Integration Board linking Defence, DoD and DFA with quarterly reviews based on Schiff’s indicators.

security governance.

**4 | Integration as Practice — From Concept to Credibility**

Integration must be deliberate. Structural reform without trust isolates; coordination without ethics invites suspicion; ethics without capacity becomes rhetoric. Resilience succeeds only when all three balance. NATO’s (2022) Strategic Concept defines resilience as a strategic task. The HCSS (2023) study reframes information as manoeuvre. USMC (2022) doctrine makes information a warfighting function. López Garay (2025) warns that social media are cognitive weapons. Together they show resilience is not a communications exercise—it is tempo, integration and moral discipline.

For the Defence Forces, this means converting insight into habit. First, embed Defence permanently within the OEP and national cyber structures. Second, formalise civil: support operations as mission: type orders, not ad hoc requests. Third, reward liaison, cyber and communications expertise in promotion pathways so resilience complements, not replaces, warfighting skill.

These reforms would turn occasional cooperation into standing concordance—an Irish form of strategic mission command. They would also counter the illusion of cost: free expansion. Expanding military roles inside society is not a free lunch: it trades capacity, reputation and neutrality unless bounded by ethics and design.

Limit. Resource constraints and cultural caution risk delaying reform beyond the current strategic cycle.  
Implication. Link resilience metrics to core defence outputs so integration strengthens rather than substitutes combat credibility.

**Clausewitz’s trinity – passion, chance and reason –** still applies. Said differently, human emotion, the fog of war and logical command apply to the military instrument in national resilience. Mission command embodies reason. Adaptation is needed to balance the unpredictability resulting from chance and passion. Is should channel passion and mitigate chance. The military brings adaptation through mission command to national resilience.

As OC BSG overseas, I saw how difficult it was for distinct military functions within my company to operate together. Engineers, MPs, EOD, Medics and transport don’t typically operate as a team. Parallels with national instruments are clear. From a command perspective, the military instrument must embrace the passion & chance, employing mission command to knit the means of disparate national instruments. For senior leaders, it means producing doctrine (such as our ATCP doctrine) which empowers operations and tactics. If this is correct, it conforms to Janowitz’s “constabulary” model or Schiff’s “concordance theory”. Both reject Huntington’s “separation” model. An active military, on the domestic front, also has the propensity for domestic military intervention, as illustrated by Lasswell's theory of the "garrison state."